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Summary
'i ho recent rise in the price of oil has caused some immediate 
problems. But, provided these are overcome, it can break the 
present impasse in the Third World. Part of the increased 
revenues of oil exporters will become a new source of aid 
(which will be spent largely in the industrial countries). 
Moreover, the shift in the price structure will favour 
traditional rather than modern techniques, agricultural rather 
tdan industrial products and natural rather than synthetic 
1 •<!(• rials; it will also reduce the concentration of real 
ncome. Much depends, however, on the price policies of 
! trolcum importers and the aid policies of the new donors.
by Dudley Seers ';v-V '
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The International Development Strategy of the United Nations, 
adopted for the decade of the 1970s, is dead, like the Pearson 
Report and the UNCTAD resolutions on which it was based. It has 
been killed., before the scheduled mid-term review, by the rise 
in oil prices from about S3 to Sll a barrel. I shall try to show, 
however, that this has opened up entirely new possibilities of 
international cooperation to make inroads into mass poverty.
The implauslbility of the "International Development Strategy1'
The 11 strategy” was never really credible, because in the rich 
countries it has relied essentially on.an appeal to internation­
alism. This is not likely to be a powerful political force in 
countries where self-advancement has been the mainspring of 
economic progress, and there are strong currents of racialism 
and chauvinism.
Political objectives, such as acquiring bases and consolidating 
spheres of influence, have been more persuasive arguments for 
the trade and aid policies which lie at the heart of the 
’’strategy", but the importance of such arguments has been 
reduced by the development of long-range missiles and the 
East-West detente. Currently the main support of aid lobbi.es 
is the multinational corporation and the motives stressed in the 
statements of major donors are trade and private investment. 
However, their commercial interest has been switching to other 
parts of the world.
effects of unselective mod'emisation
Even if the "strategy” had been sincerely endorsed by the 
industrial countries and implemented, it could hardly have 
halted the polarisation which is taking place both within and 
between countries. This derives its momentum from the rapid 
advance of technology. The great bulk of technical research
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takes place In the industrial countries and it has been designed 
to produce techniques which save labour and. undercut the prices 
of hand-made products and natural materials.
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These techniques are transferred to the Third World to back the 
implementation of growth targets (such as the 67> mentioned in 
the "strategy"), but they are too expensive, in both capital and 
foreign exchange terms, to be used widely in all but a few 
economies. Outside the modern sector, unemployment and under­
employment have remained chronic or even, in some cases, increased.
The rising incomes in the modern sector .tend to be spent 
on goods and services that incorporate recent technology, such ■ 
as consumer durables, motor cars and air travel. A large part 
of the incomes generated by these purchases flow overseas (because 
of the investment and technology needed) - most of the remainder 
accruing to the capitalists and workers of the modern sector itself.
There are other reasons why polarisation tends to be cumulative. A la
part of the explanation of the persistence of high fertility in the 
traditional sectors of the Third World lies in their social 
deprivation, but the consequent fast rate of growth in the labour 
force depresses incomes and perpetuates the deprivation.
Inequality is further promoted by the political power generated 
by modernisation. Governments in the Third World are increasingly 
controlled by the modern sector, furthering its interests by the 
operation of exchange controls, high tariffs, etc. They defend 
stubbornly the imported life style of a small minority, often 
oppressing egalitarian forces by police brutality, even torture.
In the end, a number of such regimes may be overthrown by mounting 
internal tensions, but the struggle could prove long and painful.
Although some aid is beneficial (e.g. to the rural sector in 
countries where egalitarian policies are followed) much of it 
accelerates the process of polarisation. Both capital aid, 
especially tied aid, and technical assistance are channels th 
which inappropriate technology flows. Moreover, donors natui 
have a bias towards governments with policies of welcoming 
multinational corporations to develop the modern sector, and
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resisting radical internal changes. 
The dangers of a world recession •
It may seem strange to talk of new development opportunities 
at a time when many oil importers, especially India and Bangla Desh 
are facing acute foreign exchange problems due to the rise in 
the price of oil. The world econoray could indeed deteriorate 
disastrously this year. As the industrial countries find their 
payment deficits increasing, they will be tempted to adopt 
deflationary policies and also devalue their currencies, in 
order to throw the problem as much as possible onto their 
competitors. The result would be a collapse of world trade, as 
in the early 1930s. The Third World would face big declines in 
the price (and value) of their exports, as well as a fall in aid, 
on top of the sharp rise in their import bills - which has 
already occurred.
On this scanario, the political repercussions would be immense.
The tensions in the Third World would become still greater.
There would be upheavals in many industrial countries, and while, 
these might produce overdue changes in their social structures, 
there is no guarantee that the regimes that succeeded to power 
would follow policies which were less destructive, either 
nationally or internationally. There could come a point at 
which the governments of industrial countries, separately -'y 
or together, would invade petroleum exporters (or organise coups 
d ’etat) and seize oilfields, risking the consequent short-term 
disruption. The dangers of a world war would become severe.
Development specialists have acquired a taste for pessimism, 
and with these possibilities ahead it is not surprising that they 
arc gloomy. But although the sequence outlined above has already
started to unroll, the bitter end is by no means inevitable.
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The Third World’s immediate problem could be solved if Venezuela’s 
initiative is adopted and OPEC members agree to supply oil on 
long-term credit. There is a strong moral case for this, 
especially in the case of really poor countries, such as India.
For the industrial countries to maintain economic expansion 
over the next 2 or 3 years the conditions are (i) that central 
banks cooperate to prevent the movement of oil exporters’ funds 
causing national crises; (ii) that total investment is maintained, 
which requires astute policies, since funds need to be diverted 
from industries which are energy-intensive-(such as steel) or 
produce energy-using products (such as cars) to the development, 
of petroleum, coal and other sources of energy; (iii) that 
governments facilitate the necessary shifts of labour; (iv) that 
governments do not lose their nerve when price inflation accelerate; 
as it will do on this scenario because not merely will oil prices 
rise: those who suffer will try to maintain their incomes.
The options before petroleum exporters
In the longer term, the crux of the matter is how members of OPEC 
will use their foreign exchange earnings, which are now running at 
over $100-billion a year. Some with limited development possib­
ilities (such as Saudi Arabia) might be tempted to leave their oil 
in the ground, but they would themselves be affected if the result 
were a world recession, especially since they are somewhat 
dependent militarily on the industrial countries. They would also 
hot want to stimulate the development of other sources of energy 
too strongly, or to strengthen the United States too much at the 
expense of Western Europe, which would be the result of a serious 
oil shortage.
There are not many ways they can use their foreign exchange earnings. 
There is a limit to what they will want to import, including arms, 
as there also is to the monetary assets they will want to hold, 
even if these arc guaranteed against inflation - and huge, highly 
mobile, liabilities are not convenient for the industrial countries 
either. *
Petroleum exporters could tie most of their exchange receipts up 
in direct investments (or equities) in the industrial countries.
But they may well consider that this would leave them exposed 
to the threat of expropriation, which would reduce the political 
leverage they would otherwise enjoy. Moreover governments of 
industrial countries would naturally look askance at rising 
foreign ownership of their productive systems.
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The latter v7J.ll want to earn enough to balance their foreign 
payments. Some of them individually may be able to manage this 
by bilateral deals, but that only increases the pressure on the 
remainder. As a group the only way theyVcan do this is if big
sums arc lent to the Communist bloc or the Third World, and
used to buy manufactures. Then the productive power of the
industrial countries would get a stimulus comparable to what it
obtains from a minor war. The Communist countries are hungry 
for capital, and would no doubt be able to provide a good 
financial return, but governments of petroleum producers have 
their own reasons for not investing a large fraction of their 
revenues in the COMECON (or Chinese) area.
n big aid programme is the only way left of absorbing sizeable fund 
Moreover it would diversify the assets of the petroleum countries, 
increase their political power, and reduce international criticism 
of high oil prices. It would be almighty boost to Third World 
development if even only 10% of the proceeds of oil exports were 
used in this way.
A real international development”strategy” is therefore now 
possible. Unlike the present one, this could be based on the 
clear self-interest of all types of government. . Although parts 
of the dead strategy could be incorporated in a new one, it 
should be formally buried, so as to clear the ground.
The effects of changes in the structure of prices
The effect of the change in oil prices on price structures will 
tilt the world’s economic axis: it will offset the influences
of modern technology, which contribute to polarisation.
Techniques v?hich require little commercial energy, 
in red at ion to human labour will bp f ayoui ed, if only
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Products requiring a good deal of energy to make 
in particular engineering goods, will become 
somewhat dearer in relation to foodstuffs., especially
•* those requiring little processing, such as bananas 
and coffee. (This will be partially offset by the 
sharp increase in freight rates on bulk cargoes.)
As a broad generalisation, industry will lose ground 
slightly, relative to agriculture and services.
Synthetics with a petrochemical base, such as nylon 
will become more expensive in relation to natural 5 - 
materials such as cotton; the same applies to 
plastics, detergents and artificial rubber and 
fertilisers. Goods and services which arc heavy 
users of petroleum will suffer competitively.
- Travel by aeroplanes and cars (especially large cars) 
will become dearer relative to ships, trains, buses 
and - much more so -- cycles, bullock carts and horses. 
The 2-litre car will be extremely expensive to run 
and the modern pterodactyl, Concorde, can expect a 
coup de grace. Air forces will become even more of 
a luxury than they are already.
t One consequence will be that research, even in the industrial 
countries, will be shifted towards technologies which save 
petroleum, which means in many cases capital as well. Technical 
innovations v7ill become somewhat more relevant: to the needs of 
the Third World, and its local research will be stimulated.
Another general effect will be egalitarian. The oil price acts 
like a progressive tax, because the higher a person’s income the 
higher the proportion spent on petroleum products and on goods 
(and services) which are oil-intensive in either their production 
or use (or both). This applies to nations or regions as well as 
individuals: industrialised countries will be hit much harder
than the ’’least developed”, and cities more than rural areas.
Many of these effects are slight in themselves bat they all work 
in the same direction. Thus the factory owner faces increases 
simultaneously in the cost of power, spare parts and petrochemical 
products. And psychological resistance to modernisation 
should be strengthened.
Just as in the era of cheap fuel, changes in technique, income 
distribution and politics reinforced each other, especially m  
fast-growing economies, so there could now be in some countries
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a cumulative movement in the other direction, alleviating 




There are other big question marks. Much depends on whether the
increased price of oil is fully passed on to the consumer, both
directly through products and indirectly through electric power.
The realignment of fuel prices, which will cause bankruptcies
and job changes, will of course be fiercely resisted by the
politically powerful capitalists, workers and bureaucrats of the
modern sector. Will they succeed in getting fuel tax reductions,
special exchange rates, subsidies, etc.? And how much of the price 
increases will be captured by the petroleum companies?
A great deal also hangs on whether effective ways are found of 
promoting egalitarian development strategies. Will petroleum 
exportcrs take over the role of the present major donors, 
pouring capital and technique into the modern sectors of the 
Third World and backing authoritarian regimes? They would be 
under some pressure to do so - and would be bound to rely on 
foreign consultants in some degree. They might also be tempted 
to provide aid in the form of cheap petroleum. Nearly all 
countries of the Third World where oil accounts for more than 
257o of their import bill are military dictatorships that 
protect inequality. * Besides cheap petroleum would make it 
unnecessary to adjust technologies.
Moreover, all aid donors tend to export their own ideologies 
and institutions, however inappropriate these are to local 
conditions, and the governments of oil producers, especially 
the small ones (precisely those with most funds available) do 
not see in their own experience reason to distrust modern 
technology.
The effects would bo similar if petroleum producers steered 
aid towards Third World petroleum consumers, though this may be 
necessary as a short-run expedient, see above.
However, they have built up experience in handling multinational 
corporations and controlling markets: this could be useful
elsewhere, not least to metal exporters. • And the very appearance/the. a, c company fug .ol a major new source of aid, whatever / ideology, 'will weaken
the dependence of Third World countries on their traditional
sources, reducing the constraints on radical social policies.
Aid from petroleum producers will not merely be untied (they 
have little motive for tying); it need not be spent on 
equipment at all. Balance-of-payments support would, just as 
well as project aid, fulfil the function of stimulating the world 
economy. It would be much simpler to administer - and speed in 
absorbing the oil funds is essential. It would also be less * 
likely to carry with it technology which was inappropriate.
Another possibility would be to build food reserves for famine rcli
The remainder of 1974 will be decisive - the impact of the oil 
crisis will become clear, including the extent to which 
governments are prepared to cooperate in solving it and 
turning it to the advantage of the world as a. whole.
There is only one forum for this cooperation - the United Nations, 
The new strategy cannot be worked out just at a Washington conferenc 
of industrial countries, or an OPEC meeting. It needs the interact] 
of the political interests of all three parties, especially the Thii 
World, which is at present not being adequately consulted. This if 
the biggest opportunity the United Nations system ever bad. But do 
staff members (in New York and in the agencies) have the capacity 
to seize it? Will they be permitted to do so by their political 
masters?
* * * * * * *
Perhaps ultimately the most significant effects of the end of 
the era of cheap energy will be on the ways in which people think 
about the problems of development. Scepticism about philosophies 
of fast growth, based on protected industrialisation and rapid 
urbanisation, will be strengthened. Secondly, it is now possible 
to envisage a programme of international cooperation without 
relying primarily on altruism.
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